
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New Command Structure

- Discussed Baghdad Command and Control with Iraqis today.
- Coalition units under Coalition control w/o exception despite press report.
- Coalition remains fully responsible for Baghdad Security until we pass OPCON of 6th and 9th Divisions to IGFC. Then share responsibility until Baghdad Province PIC this summer.
 - Important done this way to preserve Coalition freedom of action and enable continued work with National and Local Police units.
- Iraqi chain of command will run from PM thru "Crisis Cell" (MOD, MOI, NSA, myself, and GEN Babiker, head of Iraqi Armed Forces.) to LTG Aboud. Gives PM control over his units. RPEEF / ERPEEF NSPEEF NSPEEF Aboud's Headquarters in Adnan Palace initial operational capability on 1
 - February. Installing communications and have support structure in place.
 - LTG Odierno working closely with Aboud to evaluate, develop working relationship, and gain his confidence in our advice.
 - Corps Headquarters will partner with Aboud's Headquarters and 1CD (MND-B) will partner with the two Subordinate Headquarters.
 - MND-B Battalions partner with each Iraqi Brigades in nine districts. .
- Partnership arrangement enables deconflict in event PM issues orders to units in conflict with our operations.
 - Expect manning and initial operational capability in the Districts by 5 February. Grow to full operational capability with improved police stations by end of February. .

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Maliki Role in ROE

- conditions on what can/ cannot be done to enhance security; and (3) no Maliki has agree to (1) pursue all wrong-doers equally; (2) no presubsequent restrictions on action once undertaken.
- Gaining confidence. In October, quite agitated whenever we conducted operations in vicinity Sadr City and involved in obtaining release of Sadr allies.
- First concession was ten-name list of permissible targets but we had to work hard to gain approval. Even then vetoed one.
- Now, have conducted operations in Sadr City and picked up three of five High Value Sadr allies w/o a peep.
- We have no present restrictions on Sadr City operations.
- Indirect approach SBCT operations in New Baghdad and Shaab/Ur working. Sadr allies very nervous. Sensitive reporting indicates very concerned Coalition will attack.
- outside, key allies attempting to flee. Shia Death Squad activity down 35% Evidence of defensive preparations in Sadr City, heavy weapons moved last five weeks..
- Generally five week decline in ethno-sectarian violence in Baghdad. Incidents in Baghdad down 40% and Casualties down 60%


Iltizam Mushtarak – United Commitment

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Maliki Concessions

- command Iraqi forces in Baghdad. Subordinate to "Crisis Cell" (composed of MOD, MOI, CG MNF, NSA, and Chief JFC) reporting to Prime Minister. Appoint and empower a Military Commander to
 - Permit no political interference with security operations.
- Declared militias will not be permitted to operate in a / manner that replaces ISF as dominant security force.
 - Treat all lawbreakers equally. Will not favor one sect over another.
- · No safe havens all areas of Baghdad subject to enforcement by security forces.
- Provide three Brigades to Baghdad and sustain force level.



Approved for Release

Page 7 redacted for the following reason:

4ng nbar Situation Wrene in liter plear SECREI EL MCFI // 2

- persistent presence in urban areas, but able to cause disorder with ruthless AOI remains dominant threat in Anbar. Unable to make headway against tactics.
 - •12-week attack decline. Effectiveness down to 18% (vice 22% v CF nationwide).
 - 90-day average of 61 attacks per day. Down from 62.5 two weeks ago.
- development, political progress, and economic reconstruction thru murder Targets starting to shift from Coalition to ISF. Attempting slow IP and infimidation.
 - Ramadi is AQI focal point. Do not own the city, but challenge daily.
 - 90-day attack average in Ramadi decreased .5 from two weeks ago to 21.
 AQI now using rural villages along WERV for refuge.
 Political, Economic, and Reconstruction Progress last two weeks.
- •10 January, Sahawa al-Anbar leader Sheikh Sattar hosted Ramadi Reconstruction Conference. Several hundred tribal sheikhs, contractors, and local politicians
 - Dubai Business Exchange: 9-12 January representatives from Al Anbar, Bagdad, Hillah, Basra met with Gulf Region Businessmen to discuss economic development.
- Brinkley Group developing Al Anbar plan for increased power based on French Generator and phosphate plant
- Wireless Local Loop funded with Economic Support Funds via PRT, not CERP, Full service estimated for Fallujah April 2006 and Ramadi sometime thereafter.
 - RFF funds received \$28M, awaiting delivery of \$26M, Governor working with MoF for remaining funds for final 40% not committed.
 - DFI Received \$10.6M of \$75M promised 29 projects have SOW & given go ahead to start from Governor & envineer staff

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| (S) Anbar Situation (continued) | tinued) |
|---|----------------------------|
| - 3 Emergency Restranse Units now onerational (IOC) in Ramadi | ibed |
| | oups |
| Ongoing engagement with GOI on following priority actions: Housing Provide affordable housing | s: S: Adable housing |
| Privatization Law to generate investment in private enterprises. Concluding processes needed to restructure state-owned enterprises. | icee |
| Developing Iraqi employment program. Need to ensure equitable distribution/expenditure of funds. | |
| • Operational restructuring/recapitalization of state-own banks. | mer |
| Pushing to re-open 5 viable state-owned enterprises Al Qaim Cement, Ramadi Ceramic, Ramadi Ceramic, Ramadi Cement, Al Qaim Phosphate. | cement, Ramadi |
| · Selecting initial Industrial/Commercial Zones for focused development. | opment. |
| Reconstruction. Begin transition of planning and contract selection for utilities projects to Gol. | rojects to GoI. |
| • Develop capital projects for execution in CY 07. | |
| • Complete repairs and re-open AI Andar rail line (bagndag - AI Qaim). • Stand up three additional Provincial Reconstruction Teams. | aim). |
| Move power generation equipment from Jordan to Al Anbar. Complete major water and power generation projects by GRD. | |
| Operations Roll-up be Provided by StratOps. | |

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| Key Legislative Items Update Ce-Ba'thifeaton Reform Legislation December 0 January draft does not incorporate changes Chalabi agreed upon in December 0 Data not indicative of real de-Ba'ath reform effort 0 Darati not indicative of real de-Ba'ath reform effort 0 USMI does not support the thaft; will continue outreach to Sunni political leaders 1 USMI does not support the thaft; will continue outreach to Sunni political leaders 1 USMI does not support the thaft; will continue outreach to Sunni political leaders 1 USMI does not support the thaft; will continue outreach to Sunni political leaders 1 USMI does not support the thaft; will continue outreach to Sunni political leaders 1 USMI does not support the thaft; will continue outreach to Sunni political leaders 1 USMI does not support the thaft; will continue outreach to Sunni political leaders 1 USMI require additional legislation following passage of Hydrocarbon Law 1 USMI require additional legislation following passage when the twentees haring trains quorum 1 Use the traine additional legislation following passage when the twentees haring the traine glotical rowning the traine glotical rowning to the traine glotical rowning to the traine glotical rowning to the traine gloting the treading compreach completed 18 January | De-Ba'thification Reform Legislation • 9 January draft does not incorporate changes Chalabi agreed upon in December | USMI does not support the draft; will continue outreach to Sunni political leaders USMI does not support the draft; will continue outreach to Sunni political leaders Jydrocarbon Law Draft submitted to Council of Ministers for approval Key players have verbal agreement on population-based revenue sharing Will require additional legislation following passage of Hydrocarbon Law | Commission chicved; expect passage when CoR attains quorum aw d 18 January | s 10 December. ited Commitment <u>SECRET// REL MCF1 // 20170120</u> 13 |
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| | De-Ba'thification Reform Legislation • 9 January draft does not incorporate changes December | USMI does not support the draft; will continue outre leaders USMI does not support the draft; will continue outre leaders Hydrocarbon Law Draft submitted to Council of Ministers for approval Key players have verbal agreement on population-bas Will require additional legislation following passage or | | Last time COR had Quorum was 10 December. |

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